Social Contract Ambiguity – Econlib

The Flaws in Social Contract Theory According to Michael Huemer

Michael Huemer’s book The Problem of Political Authority delves into the concept of political authority and the arguments used to justify its existence. Huemer defines political authority as having two components:

(i) Political legitimacy: the government’s right to create and enforce laws through coercion, essentially the right to rule.

(ii) Political obligation: the citizens’ duty to obey the government, even when similar commands from non-governmental entities would not be obligatory.

In his thorough analysis, Huemer scrutinizes various popular arguments advocating for political authority and finds them all lacking. However, he clarifies that the absence of authority does not necessarily imply that governments should be abolished outright. Individuals may still have valid reasons to comply with most laws, and state agents may have legitimate grounds for enforcing certain regulations to maintain order.

Two chapters in Huemer’s book are dedicated to dissecting social contract theory as a basis for political authority. He examines both traditional social contract theories, like John Locke’s, and more contemporary versions that propose a hypothetical agreement leading to the establishment of government authority and citizen obligations.

Huemer effectively dismantles social contract theories by highlighting their fundamental flaws. One crucial argument he presents is the lack of essential contract elements in all forms of social contract theories. For instance, the notion that by accepting government services, individuals implicitly consent to taxation under the social contract is debunked by Huemer. He illustrates that true consent cannot be inferred from actions if coercion is involved, drawing a parallel with a forced transaction scenario.

Another critical issue with social contract theory that Huemer points out is the ambiguity surrounding the contents of the supposed contract. Despite claims of a social contract existing, there is widespread disagreement on its precise terms among theorists. This lack of consensus raises doubts about the validity and enforceability of a contract with such indefinite provisions.

Moreover, Huemer suggests that many social contract theorists use the concept as a vessel to advance their personal policy preferences rather than objectively defining the terms of the contract. This subjective interpretation undermines the credibility of the social contract theory, as it fails to address conflicting views on what the contract entails.

Similar to criticisms of constitutional legal theory, where interpretations align with ideological stances, social contract theory appears to suffer from bias in shaping the narrative to suit individual preferences rather than objectively defining the terms of the contract.

In conclusion, Huemer’s scrutiny of social contract theory reveals significant shortcomings in its foundational principles and application. The lack of clear contract elements, disputes over contractual terms, and subjective interpretations cast doubt on the validity and practicality of social contract theories as a basis for political authority.